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Operative Gift and Bequest Motives
Abstract
The Ricardian Equivalence Theorem, which is the proposition that changes in the timing of lump-sum taxes
have no effect on assumption or capital accumulation, depends on the exist- of operative altruistic motives for
intergenerational transfers. These transfers can be bequests from parents to children or gifts from children to
parents. In order for the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem to hold, one of these transfer motives must be
operative in the sense that the level of the transfer is not determined by a corner solution resulting from a
binding non-negativity constraint This paper derives conditions that determine whether the bequest motive
will be operative, the gift motive will be operative, or neither motive will be operative in a model in which
consumers are altruistic toward their parents and their children.
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 Operative Gift and Bequest Motives
 By ANDREW B. ABEL*
 In a pioneering paper, Robert Barro (1974)
 demonstrated that if consumers have oper-
 ative altruistic bequest motives, then a reduc-
 tion in lump-sum taxes, accompanied by the
 issue of an equal amount of government
 bonds, has no effect on the allocation of
 resources. Barro stressed that this result,
 which has come to be known as the Ricardian
 Equivalence Theorem, requires that the be-
 quest motive be operative. In this context,
 the term "operative" means that equilibrium
 bequests are determined by tangency con-
 ditions rather than by corner solutions such
 as may arise from binding nonnegativity
 constraints. If the bequest motive is not op-
 erative, then the Ricardian equivalence result
 presented by Barro does not hold, and
 there are important effects associated with
 the government's choice between debt fi-
 nance and taxes.
 More recently, Willem Buiter (1979) and
 Jeffrey Carmichael (1982) have analyzed the
 altruistic gift motive in which consumers
 obtain utility from the utility of their parents,
 and thus may be motivated to give resources
 to their parents. Their analyses confirm
 Barro's claim (p. 1104) that if the gift motive
 is operative, then the Ricardian Equivalence
 Theorem holds. If the gift motive is not
 operative, then the Ricardian Equivalence
 Theorem fails to hold.
 Because the Ricardian Equivalence The-
 orem depends on an operative motive for
 private intergenerational transfers, it is im-
 portant to determine the conditions under
 which either transfer motive will be opera-
 tive. Several papers have studied whether the
 bequest motive is operative in a variety of
 different models' but the literature does not
 contain an analysis of the conditions that
 determine whether the gift motive is opera-
 tive. In this paper, I will study the conditions
 for an operative gift motive. However, rather
 than confine the analysis to a model in which
 consumers have only a gift motive, I will
 assume that individual consumers have two-
 sided transfer motives. That is, I will assume
 that individual consumers have both a gift
 motive and a bequest motive as in John
 Burbidge (1983), Buiter and Carmichael
 (1984), and Burbidge (1984).2 In the steady-
 state equilibrium, the gift motive may be
 operative, the bequest motive may be opera-
 tive, or neither motive may be operative. If
 either of the intergenerational transfer mo-
 tives is operative, then the Ricardian
 Equivalence Theorem holds; however, if
 neither motive is operative, then changes in
 the timing of lump-sum taxes have impor-
 tant effects on the intertemporal and inter-
 generational allocation of resources.3
 The major goal of this paper is to deter-
 mine conditions under which each of the
 intergenerational transfer motives is opera-
 tive if individual consumers have two-sided
 transfer motives. As a prerequisite to this
 analysis, I will discuss, in Section I, ap-
 propriate restrictions on the gift motive and
 the bequest motive. In Section II, I will
 discuss the restrictions on two-sided transfer
 motives implied by intergenerational consis-
 *Department of Finance, Wharton School of the
 University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104-
 6367. Previous versions of this paper were written
 while I was an Associate Professor at Harvard Univer-
 sity. I thank B. Douglas Bernheim, Olivier Blanchard,
 Stanley Fischer, Miles Kimball, Lawrence Summers,
 and Philippe Weil for helpful discussions. Financial
 support from the Amoco Foundation Term Professor-
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 'See Allan Drazen (1978), Weil (1987), Alex Cukier-
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 2Recently, Miles Kimball (1986) has extended the
 analysis in this paper to analyze the conditions under
 which there will be an operative bequest motive under
 two-sided altruism.
 3As pointed out by Carmichael, in order for the
 Ricardian Equivalence Theorem to hold, the same
 transfer motive must be operative both before and after
 the change in fiscal policy.
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 tency. The specification of the motives for
 intergenerational transfers has important
 implications for a wide range of issues
 extending beyond the effects of fiscal policy,
 including the intergenerational transmission
 of inequality,4 and for the behavior of
 financial markets, especially markets for life
 insurance and annuities.5 In Section III I
 discuss the endogenous determination of
 equilibrium factor prices and then describe
 the steady-state equilibrium. The conditions
 under which one or the other of the transfer
 motives is operative are derived in Sec-
 tion IV. I present concluding remarks in
 Section V.
 I. A Two-Sided Transfer Motive
 In this section I present a two-sided
 transfer motive and discuss appropriate
 restrictions on the parameters of the transfer
 motive. Consider a representative consumer
 economy in which each consumer lives for
 two periods. A generation t consumer is
 born at the beginning of period t. consumes
 clt in period t at age 1 and consumes c2t+1
 in period t + 1 at age 2. Let ut = U(clto c2t+1)
 be the utility that a generation t consumer
 obtains directly from his own consumption.
 Defining ult as d u(cjt,c2t+1)/dcjt and u2t+1
 as du(clt, c2t,?)/3c2t+1, assume that u,t > O,
 u2t+l> >O and that ult(O. ) = x= u2t+(, 0).
 Also, assume that u(-,.) is strictly concave
 and that c1t and c2t+1 are normal goods.
 In addition to obtaining utility directly
 from his own consumption, a generation t
 consumer obtains utility from the consump-
 tion of his parents and from the consumption
 of all of his descendants. In particular, I will
 use the Buiter-Carmichael (1984) generali-
 zation of the Burbidge (1983) two-sided
 utility function
 00
 (1) vt ut + aut- 1 + E, Ajut+=
 j=-1
 The parameter /3 measures the strength of
 the bequest motive and satisfies the re-
 striction 0 ?,B <1. The assumption that /3
 must be less than one is the standard as-
 sumption in the literature6 and is necessary
 and sufficient for the transversality condition
 to hold in the steady state with constant per
 capita consumption. The nonnegative para-
 meter a measures the strength of the gift
 motive. There is no compelling reason to
 restrict a to be less than one.7'8 I will show
 in Section II that intergenerational consis-
 tency (defined below) places an upper bound
 on the admissible values of a, but depending
 on the value of /3, this upper bound may be
 greater than, equal to, or less than one.
 4See Andrew Abel (1985), Laurence Kotlikoff et al.
 (1984); and Nigel Tomes (1981).
 5See, for example, Stanley Fischer (1973) and
 Benjamin Friedman and Mark Warshawsky (1984).
 6See, for example, Buiter (1979), Buiter and Car-
 michael (1984), Carmichael (1982), Burbidge (1983,
 1984), and Philippe Weil (1987).
 7Buiter-Carmichael (1984) note that the specification
 of the gift motive as v, = u, + av,_1 implies that v, -
 (-,' u t _j. They argue that if a > 1, then the utility v,
 is unbounded as t approaches infinity. However, even if
 a > 1, the maximization of (3) subject to the constraints
 on the generation t consumer is a well-defined maximi-
 zation problem.
 Alternatively, Buiter-Carmichael point out that if v,
 is constant over time, then the "steady-state utility
 function" is u(C1,C2) U(C1,C2)/[1-al where c, is
 the steady-state consumption of consumers of age i.
 They observe that if a>1, then "the model has the
 peculiar characteristic that the steady-state utility
 function v(*) has the opposite properties to the
 consumption utility u(-); for example, if u(-) is posi-
 tive and increasing in cl and c2, v( ) is negative and
 decreasing in cl and c2." (p. 763) However, the
 "steady-state utility function" v(-) is not a useful
 construct. Paul Samuelson (1968) showed that the
 steady-state capital stock is lower than the Golden Rule
 capital stock if consumption is allocated to maximize
 the weighted sum of utility of all generations, with
 declining weights on future generations (which is
 formally identical to the problem faced by consumers
 with a bequest motive in (2)). Maximization of the
 "steady-state utility function" led Buiter (1979) to
 conclude erroneously that if either the bequest motive
 or the gift motive is operative, then a competitive
 economy would attain the Golden Rule in the steady
 state and that "lump-sum taxation and debt policy will
 not affect the steady-state capital-labor ratio if there are
 both bequest and gift motives." (p. 425).
 81n an interesting analysis of consumption and gift
 behavior under a specific assumption about expectations
 of future gifts, Hajime Hori and Jun Tsukamoto (1985)
 analyze the case in which a> 1 as well as the case in
 which a < 1.
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 The two-sided utility function in (1) nests
 both the one-sided altruistic bequest motive
 and the one-sided altruistic gift motive. The
 one-sided altruistic bequest motive is often
 specified recursively as
 (2) v,t= ut + vt+ 1,
 When a(= 0, the utility function in (1) is
 consistent with the recursively specified
 altruistic bequest motive in (2).9
 The one-sided gift motive is often speci-
 fied recursively as vt = ut + av,1, which can
 be rewritten as
 (3) v= ut + aut,_ + a2vt2.
 From the point of view of the generation t
 consumer with the one-sided gift motive in
 (3), the utility of his grandparent, Vt-2, is
 fixed; maximization of the utility function in
 (3) is equivalent to maximization of the utility
 function in (1) when /3 = 0. Thus, the utility
 function in (1) nests the one-sided altruistic
 bequest motive and the one-sided altruistic
 gift motive.'0
 Before presenting the consumer's bud-
 get constraint, it is necessary to describe
 the demographic composition of dynastic
 families. Each consumer lives for two periods
 and has n ?1 children at the beginning of
 the second period of his life. This as-
 sumption follows the standard convention of
 ignoring the fact that it takes two people
 from different families to produce children."1
 In the model, each consumer has n children
 and has one parent.'2
 Let g, be the gift given by a generation t
 consumer to his parent who is a generation
 t -1 consumer. This gift is made during
 period t which is the only period during
 which both generations are alive. Because
 the generation t consumer has one parent
 and n children, this consumer gives a gift of
 gt in period t and receives gifts totaling
 ngt + 1in period t + 1.
 Let bt be the bequest given by a generation
 t consumer to each of his n children
 (generation t + 1 consumers) in period t + 1.
 The generation t consumer receives a bequest
 bt -1 from his parent in period t. In addition
 to receiving the bequest bt1 in period t, the
 generation t consumer inelastically supplies
 one unit of labor in period t and receives the
 real wage rate wt in period t. The generation
 t consumer is retired in period t + 1. Letting
 R +1 be the gross rate of return on saving
 held from period t to period t + 1, the budget
 constraint of a representative period t
 consumer is
 (4) [clt + gt]Rt,+l +C2t+1+ nbt
 = [wt + b,]Rt+l + ngt+,.
 The left-hand side of (4) contains the
 generation t consumer's expenditure on his
 own consumption in the two periods of his
 life plus the expenditure on bequests to
 children and a gift to his parent. The right-
 hand side of (4) contains the three sources of
 the generation t consumer's resources: labor
 income, bequest received from his parent,
 and the gifts received from his children.
 I use the standard Nash assumption that
 in choosing optimal values of consumption,
 9Douglas Gale (1983) has pointed out that there is
 an infinity of infinite-horizon utility functions which are
 consistent with the recursive formulation in (2). By
 starting with equation (1) as the specification of
 preferences, I am explicitly choosing one solution, a
 practice which is followed, at least implicitly, in an
 overwhelming majority of the literature.
 ?The relation between the utility function in (1) and
 "two-sided altruism" is discussed in Miles Kimball
 (1986).
 I'Douglas Bernheim and Kyle Bagwell (1984) have
 recently provided a stimulating analysis of the impli-
 cations of marriage and altruism for the efficacy of fiscal
 policy.
 12This point has not been appreciated in the gift
 motive literature. In fairness to Carmichael, it must be
 noted that he seemed to be aware of this point and
 avoided its implications by treating the "descendents
 and forebearers as though there were only one of each;
 the descendent will be n times 'bigger,' and the fore-
 bearer n times 'smaller' than the individual." (1979, fn.
 2). Subsequently, Buiter and Carmichael (1984, p. 763,
 fn. 2) recognized that each consumer has one, rather
 than l/n, (set of) parent(s). They use this observation
 to make an insightful comment on Burbidge's specifi-
 cation of the utility function, but they ignore this
 observation in deriving optimal individual behavior
 under the Nash assumption.
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 bequests, and gifts, the consumer takes as
 given the actions of all other members of his
 dynastic family. In particular, in choosing
 gt, the generation t consumer takes as given
 the gifts given by his siblings to their com-
 mon parent. The maximization problem of a
 representative generation t consumer is to
 maximize (1) subject to (4), the nonnega-
 tivity constraints'3 gt ? 0 and bt > 0 and
 subject to the given values of the decisions of
 all other members of the dynastic family.
 Recalling that ult and u2t?1 are the deriv-
 atives of u(clt, c2t+ 1) with respect to its first
 and second arguments, respectively, the
 first-order conditions are
 (5) u=t = Rt+ u2t+
 (6) ult 2 au2t
 (holds with equality if gt > 0)
 (7) u2t+ 1 2 ( /n )u1t+ 1
 (holds with equality if bt > 0)
 Equation (5) characterizes the optimal inter-
 temporal allocation of the consumer's own
 consumption over his lifetime. If the con-
 sumer reduces clt by one unit, he suffers a
 utility loss of ult. However, if this unit of the
 consumption good is saved, then c2t+1 can
 be increased by R t + units, which increases
 utility by Rt+lu2t+l. At the optimum, the
 utility loss in period t is equated to the
 utility gain in period t + 1, as indicated
 by (5).
 Equation (6) characterizes the optimal gift
 gt. In period t, the generation t consumer
 can reduce his own consumption by one
 unit, suffering a utility loss of ult, and can
 increase the gift gt by one unit, increasing
 his parent's utility by u2,. The increase in
 parent's utility raises the generation t con-
 sumer's utility by au2t. If the optimal gift is
 at an interior optimum (g, > 0), then the
 utility loss (ul,) from the reduction in cl,
 will equal the utility gain (au2,) from the
 increased gift. If, at g, = O, the utility loss
 from reduced consumption exceeds the utility
 gain from an increased gift, then the
 consumer will not make a positive gift, and
 the nonnegativity constraint on the gift binds
 strictly. It is worth noting that if, for some
 unspecified reason, siblings jointly decide on
 the level of the gift to give to their common
 parent, or equivalently, if each consumer is
 a sumed to have 1/n parents, then the first-
 order condition (6) must be amended to
 (6') ult ? anu2t
 (holds with equality if gt > 0).
 Equation (6') corresponds to the first-order
 condition derived by Carmichael (1982) and
 is consistent with the conditions in Buiter
 and Carmichael (1984).
 Equation (7) characterizes the optimal
 bequest bt. The generation t consumer can
 reduce c2t+ 1 by one unit and increase
 the bequest to each child by 1/n, which
 increases the utility of each child by
 (1/n)ult+1. If the bequest motive is opera-
 tive (be > 0), then the utility loss from
 decreased consumption is equal to the utility
 gain from increasing the bequest. If the non-
 n gativity constraint binds strictly, then the
 inequality in (7) holds strictly.
 II. Intergenerational Consistency Under a
 Two-Sided Motive
 In this section I discuss the conditions
 under which the decisions of different gen-
 erations within a family are " intergenera-
 tionally consistent." There are two aspects of
 intergenerational consistency. First, there is
 the notion of dynamic consistency intro-
 duced by Robert Strotz (1956). Strotz showed
 that for a particular formulation of the inter-
 temporal utility function in which the dis-
 count factor between two periods depends
 only on the length of time between the two
 periods, and not on calendar time, the con-
 sumption plan will be dynamically incon-
 sistent unless the discount factors are geo-
 13 The assumption that the marginal utility of
 consumption at each age becomes infinite as the level of
 consumption approaches zero implies that any non-
 negativity constraints on consumption will not be
 binding.
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 metrically declining. In the context of the
 utility function in (1), it is important that the
 weights on u,+j are geometrically declining
 for j = 0,1, 2,.... If these weights were not
 geometrically declining, then the consump-
 tion plan would suffer from dynamic incon-
 sistency in Strotz's sense, if the bequest mo-
 tive were operative.
 The second notion of intergenerational
 consistency is that the first-order conditions
 of parents and their children should not
 contradict each other. More precisely, con-
 sider the first-order condition characterizing
 the optimal gift from a child to a parent at
 time t (equation (6)) and the first-order
 condition characterizing the optimal bequest
 from a parent to a child at time t (equation
 (7) with the time subscript decremented by
 1). If both of these first-order conditions are
 to hold, then
 (8) Ult > ?U2, ? (I3a/n)ult.
 Because u1, is assumed to be positive,
 equation (8) implies that
 (9) /a3<an.
 Equation (9) along with the restrictions 0 <
 /3 <1 and a ? 0 describe the admissible
 values of the parameters a and /3 under the
 restriction that the two-sided transfer motive
 is intergenerationally consistent.
 III. Competitive Factor Prices and
 Steady-State Equilibrium
 In the previous sections I analyzed the
 behavior of an individual dynastic family
 taking as given the factor prices wt and Rt.
 These factor prices, which are determined
 endogenously in competitive factor markets,
 depend on the productive technology. Let Yt
 be gross output in period t. This output is
 homogenous and can either be consumed
 or used as capital in the following period.
 The level of output is determined by a neo-
 classical linearly homogeneous production
 function Yt = F(Kt, Nt), where Kt is the ag-
 gregate stock of capital and Nt is the number
 of young consumers who each supply one
 unit of labor. The production function F(,)
 is a gross production function in the sense
 that the aggregate capital stock, Kt+l, is
 equal to output, Yt, minus total consumption,
 Ntc1t + Nt-1C2t, in period t. The production
 function can be written in intensive form as
 y= f(k), where y is the output-labor ratio,
 k is the capital-labor ratio, f ' > 0 and f " < 0.
 In competitive factor markets, each factor
 is paid its marginal product
 (10) Rt = R(kt)=f (kt)
 (I11) Wt = w(kt)-f (kt) -ktf (kt).
 The steady state is characterized by constant
 values of consumption for both young
 consumers and old consumers. Therefore, ult
 and u2t are each constant in the steady state.
 Equations (5)-(7) imply that in the steady
 state the interest rate R must satisfy the
 following condition
 (12) a < R < n/3.
 If one of the transfer motives is operative,
 then the steady-state interest rate is at one of
 the boundaries in (12). In particular,
 (13a) R=n/13 if b>O,
 (13b) R= a if g>O.
 Since /3 is restricted to be less than one,
 equation (13a) yields the well-known result
 that a steady state with operative bequests is
 undercapitalized relative to the Golden Rule
 (i.e., R > n). However, since a can be less
 than, greater than, or equal to n, equation
 (13b) implies that a steady state with an
 operative gift motive can be either overcapi-
 talized, undercapitalized, or at the Golden
 Rule. This result is contrary to the result in
 Carmichael (1982) that a steady state with
 an operative gift motive is overcapitalized.
 Carmichael's overcapitalization result fol-
 lows from his assumption that the gift
 parameter a must be less than one and from
 his implicit assumption that siblings jointly
 determine the gifts to their common parent
 according to (6'). Under this pair of as-
 sumptions, R = na < n in the steady state
 with operative gifts.
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 Finally, observe from (13a, b) that if af3 <
 n, then either bequests or gifts must be equal
 to zero in the steady state. In the case with
 a,8 = n, which is on the boundary of the
 admissible region of the parameter space,
 and which corresponds to Burbidge's spec-
 ification,"4 it is possible for both gifts and
 bequests to be positive in the steady state.
 However, as shown below in Section IV, the
 direction of net intergenerational transfers
 will be determinate in this case. Also note
 that with a3 = n, the range of possible val-
 ues for the steady-state interest rate in (12) is
 degenerate: the steady-state interest rate is
 equal to n /,8 = a regardless of the level of
 government debt that is serviced by lump-
 sum taxes. Finally, since at least one of the
 transfer motives is operative, the Ricardian
 Equivalence Theorem holds in this case, as
 argued by Burbidge.
 IV. When Are the Transfer Motives Operative?
 The neutrality of government debt requires
 that one of the transfer motives be operative
 both before and after the change in gov-
 ernment debt, and furthermore, that the same
 motive be operative after the change as
 before the change. Since the Ricardian
 Equivalence Theorem rests on the existence
 of an operative transfer motive, the question
 of when one of the transfer motives will be
 operative takes on great importance. In this
 section, I extend Weil's (1987) analysis of
 the one-sided bequest motive in (2) to the
 case of the two-sided utility function in (1).
 Recall that Kt+1 is the total stock of
 capital at the beginning of period t + 1. All
 of this capital is held by generation t
 consumers and, furthermore, this is the only
 asset held by these consumers. Therefore,
 letting st denote the saving of a representa-
 tive generation t consumer, it follows that
 Kt+IN tst, which can be written as
 (14) nkt+l =: St -
 Rather than determine the saving of a
 generation t consumer as the solution to an
 i finite-horizon maximization problem, I will
 follow Weil's approach and ask the fol-
 lowing question: How much would a gen-
 eration t consumer save if he earns a wage
 income wt, receives a bequest bt-1 from his
 parent, receives gifts totaling ngt+1 from his
 n children, earns a rate of return Rt+ , and,
 in addition, if he is arbitrarily required to
 leave a bequest of bt to each of his children
 and to give a gift of gt to his parent?
 Although I cannot answer this question
 explicitly at this level of generality, the saving
 function will have the following form
 (15) St s(bt1- gt + wt,
 n(gt.l - bt), Rt+?).
 The saving function in (15) depends on
 first-period income, second-period income,
 and the rate of return to saving. Under the
 assumption that clt and c21+1 are both
 normal goods, s(.,.,.) is increasing in its first
 argument and is decreasing in its second
 argument. Substituting the competitive factor
 prices (10,11) into (15), then substituting the
 resulting expression into (14) and restricting
 attention to the steady state yields
 (16) h(k, b-g) s(b-g + w(k),
 n (g-b), R (k))-nk = 0.
 I follow Peter Diamond (1965) and confine
 attention to locally stable steady states (i.e.,
 steady states for which hk< 0). To avoid
 any complications that may arise from mul-
 tiple locally stable steady states, I follow
 Weil and assume that there is a unique locally
 stable steady state. Let k = k*(z) be the
 steady-state capital labor ratio when b - g
 -z.
 As a point of reference, consider the steady
 state of the Diamond (1965) economy in
 which consumers have neither a bequest
 motive nor a gift motive. Let k D denote
 "4Actually, Burbidge departed from the Nash as-
 sumption in determining an individual consumer's
 optimal gift and thus arrived at the analogue of (6')
 rather than (6). Under this assumption, the boundary of
 the admissible region of parameter values is a/3 =1
 rather than a/3 = n. Adjusting Burbidge's analysis to
 incorporate the Nash assumption would amend his as-
 sumption to afi = n.
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 the steady-state capital-labor ratio in the
 Diamond economy. Because b = g = 0 in the
 Diamond economy, it follows that
 (17) k D = k*(O).
 Recall that the saving function s(-,,.) is
 increasing in its first argument and is de-
 creasing in its second argument. Therefore, it
 follows from the definition of h(k, z) in (16)
 that h,(k, z) > 0 and hence k*(z) is an in-
 creasing function of z.15 Because k*'(z) > 0
 and R'(k) < 0, equation (17) implies that
 (18) b-g>O as k>kD as R<RD.
 I now present simple conditions which are
 sufficient for each type of transfer motive to
 be operative. Essentially, in order for a
 transfer motive to be operative, it must be
 sufficiently strong. Proposition 1, which
 provides a sufficient condition for operative
 bequests, is due to Weil (1987); Proposition
 2, which provides a sufficient condition for
 operative gifts, is new.
 PROPOSITION 1: If: > n/RD, then b > 0.
 PROOF:
 If 8 > n/RD, then (12) implies that RD >
 n /1 ? R. Therefore, (18) implies that b - g
 > 0, which along with the nonnegativity
 constraint on g, implies that b > 0.
 PROPOSITION 2: If a > R D, then g > 0.
 PROOF:
 If a> RD, then (12) implies that RD < a
 < R. Therefore, (18) implies that b - g < 0,
 which along with the nonnegativity con-
 straint on b, implies that g > 0.
 If both transfer motives are sufficiently weak,
 then there will be no transfers in either
 direction. Precise conditions are given by
 PROPOSITION 3: If ?8 < n/RD, a< RD,
 and a3 < n, then b=g=O.
 PROOF:
 (by contradiction): Suppose that b > 0 so
 that (13a) implies that R = n/,l ? RD.
 Therefore, (18) implies that b - g < 0 which
 implies that g> 0. However, if g> 0, then
 (1 3b) implies that R = a, which contradicts
 the statements above that R = n 7/3 and a/3
 < n. Therefore, b = 0. A similar line of
 argument proves that g = 0.
 Finally, we consider the case in which
 af8 = n, which corresponds to the case
 considered by Burbidge."6 In general, it is
 possible for there to be both positive gifts
 and positive bequests in the steady state.
 Nevertheless, one can determine whether the
 net flow of intergenerational transfers is from
 parents to children (b -g > 0), from children
 to parents (b - g < 0), or zero.
 PROPOSITION 4: If a/I? = n, then b - g > 0
 as RD nl// = a.
 PROOF:
 Suppose that RD> n /3. It follows from
 (12) that RD> R which, according to (18),
 implies that b-g > O. Similarly, RD <a
 implies that RD < R, which according to
 (18) implies that b - g < 0. Finally, RD =
 n//B = a implies that RD = R, which implies
 that b - g = 0.
 The results concerning when the transfer
 motives will be operative are summarized in
 Figures 1 and 2. The distinction between
 Figures 1 and 2 is that the utility function
 u(-, ) and the production function f( ) are
 such that the steady state of the Diamond
 economy is efficient in Figure 1 but is
 inefficient in Figure 2. If the Diamond
 economy is efficient, then Figure 1 indicates
 that either the gift motive or the bequest
 motive could be operative; if neither motive
 is sufficiently strong, then neither motive will
 be operative. If the Diamond economy is
 15Formally, h(k*(z), z)-- 0, which implies that
 k*'(z) = - hz/hk > 0.  16See fn. 14.
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 inefficient, then Figure 2 indicates that, for
 admissible values of ,B, the bequest motive
 cannot be operative, which is consistent with
 Weil's (1987) results. However, the gift
 motive can be operative if it is sufficiently
 strong. Again, if neither motive is sufficiently
 strong, then neither will be operative.
 The conditions for operative transfer mo-
 tives are stated in terms of RD, the steady-
 state interest rate in the Diamond model. It
 was Weil's insight to recognize that the RD
 provides a useful summary of the utility
 function u(*, ) and the production function
 f( ) for determining whether a transfer mo-
 tive will be operative. Nevertheless, it would
 be useful to state the conditions for oper-
 ative bequests in terms of underlying prefer-
 ences and technology. As a step toward this
 goal, I will relate RD to consumer behavior
 expressed in terms of the average propensity
 to consume and to the production function
 expressed in terms of the capital share of
 income. Then, for a specific example I will
 express RD directly in terms of the parame-
 ters of preferences and technology.
 Let a, denote s,/wt, the average propensity
 to save out of wage income, and let 4, denote
 the capital share in income, R,k,/y,. Because
 the production function is assumed to be
 linearly homogeneous, the labor share in
 income, w,/y,, is equal to 1- 4t so that
 (19) w, = [(1- ojlot] Rtk.
 It follows from (19) and the definition of the
 average propensity to save, at, that
 (20) St = a [(1- j)/ot] Rkt
 Equating the left-hand side of (14) to the
 right-hand side of (20) in the steady state of
 the Diamond economy yields
 (21) nkD = a [(1 - ()p/] R DkD.
 It follows immediately from (21) that
 (22) RD = n4/[a(I -)]
 It follows from (22) that in the Diamond
 economy, the steady-state interest rate tends
 to be large when either the capital share in
 income, 4, is large or the average propensity
 to save, a, is small. Of course, the capital
 share, 4, and the average propensity to save,
 a, are, in general, endogenously determined.
 However, there is a special case in which
 both 4 and a are exogenous parameters. If
 the utility function is logarithmic, u(clt,
 C2t +l 1)(I- a)ln clt + a 1n C2t+ 1, 0 < a < 1,
 then the average propensity to save out of
 wage income is constant and equal to a. If
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 the production function is Cobb-Douglas,
 f(k)-AkV, O< 4 <1 and A > O, then the
 capital share in income is constant and equal
 to p. In this special case, the expression for
 RD on the right-hand side of (22) is simply a
 function of the parameters of preferences
 and technology. Substituting this expression
 for RD in Propositions 1-4 delivers, for this
 example, a complete characterization, in
 terms of the parameters of preferences and
 technology, of situations in which the trans-
 fer motives will be operative or inoperative.
 V. Concluding Remarks
 The effects of changes in the timing of
 lump-sum taxes depend crucially on whether
 the motives for intergenerational transfers
 are operative. In this paper I have derived
 conditions which determine whether the
 bequest motive is operative, the gift motive
 is operative, or neither motive is operative.
 When neither motive is operative, then
 changes in the timing of lump-sum taxes
 affect the intertemporal and intergenera-
 tional allocation of resources.
 The formal results presented in Prop-
 ositions 1-4 and summarized in Figures 1
 and 2 apply only to the steady state of a
 representative consumer economy. Future
 research should be devoted to extending the
 analysis to the transition path outside the
 steady state and should analyze economies
 with interesting heterogeneity. The reason
 for extending the analysis to the transition
 path is that the Ricardian Equivalence Theo-
 rem requires that all consumers in all genera-
 tions be linked by operative-intergeneration-
 al transfer motives. If some generation has
 no operative-intergenerational transfer mo-
 tive, then at least some changes in the timing
 of lump-sum taxes will affect the intertem-
 poral allocation of resources. The magnitude
 of the effect would depend on, among other
 things, the extent and sort of heterogeneity
 among consumers. For example, heterogene-
 ity with respect to initial wealth or labor
 income may lead to a situation in which
 some consumers have operative bequest mo-
 tives while other consumers in their cohort
 face binding constraints. In this situation,
 the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem would
 not hold; the extent of the departure from
 the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem, that is,
 the magnitude of the effect of fiscal policy,
 would depend on the proportion of con-
 sumers who face binding constraints. In a
 subsequent paper (Abel, 1986), I have begun
 to explore some of these issues. However, the
 model in that paper is restricted to Cobb-
 Douglas technology, logarithmic utility with
 a bequest motive but no gift motive, and the
 heterogeneity is restricted to initial wealth.
 In addition to analyzing more general utility
 and production functions, future research
 should analyze the effects of fiscal policy in
 the presence of heterogeneous labor produc-
 tivity, secular productivity growth, and two-
 sided transfer motives.
 An additional avenue for future research
 is to analyze bequest and gift behavior under
 more general forms of intergenerational
 transfer motives. Bernheim (1987) has argued
 that there is no reason to insist on dynamic
 consistency in modeling the consumption
 and transfer behavior of families. Recently,
 Debraj Ray (1987) has examined spec-
 ifications of intergenerational altruism in
 which a consumer obtains utility from the
 utility of many subsequent generations in his
 family, in addition to obtaining utility di-
 rectly from his own consumption. If, for
 example, a consumer cares about his
 grandchildren's utility in addition to his
 children's utility and his own consumption,
 then, in general, the consumption decisions
 of different generations within the family
 will display dynamic inconsistency. In ad-
 dition, Ray has shown that under this sort of
 altruistic utility function, it is possible for
 the steady state to be characterized by posi-
 tive bequests and a dynamically inefficient
 overaccumulation of capital. The determina-
 tion of conditions for the bequest motive to
 be operative or inoperative remains an open
 question in this more general framework.
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